Abstract:

[Purposes] This study aims to explore the tripartite evolutionary game mechanism and stability strategy of open access (OA) publishing and discuss the indirect intervention regime of Chinese scientific research institutions to foreign gold OA journals. [Methods] This study constructed a game model of OA publishing evolution with Chinese scientists, foreign publishers of gold OA journals, and Chinese scientific research institutions as the main players and analyzed the interaction mechanism and stability of their strategies. It also analyzed the effects of article processing charges, expected rejection rate, and scientific research institutions' regulation strategies on the game results through numerical simulation. [Findings] The equilibrium points and simulation analysis show that foreign OA journal publishers may choose two opposite strategies, namely improving or reducing the quality of the journal, which depends on the trade-offs made by scientists and scientific research institutions regarding academic benefits, time costs, and economic expenses. Scientific research institutions have strong independence in the three-party game and can effectively intervene in the outcome. [Conclusions] DChina's scientific research institutions can capitalize on their market advantages to leverage the scientific research performance evaluation system, thereby regulating scientists' willingness to submit manuscripts. By intervening in the pricing and quality management strategies of foreign gold OA journal publishers and curtailing the emergence of foreign predatory journals, the overall efficiency of China's scientific research ecosystem can be enhanced.

Key words: Open access journal, Scientist, Foreign gold open access journal publisher, Research institution, Evolutionary game, Chinese perspective

摘要：

【目的】 揭示开放获取（Open Access，OA）出版的三方演化博弈机制与稳定策略，探索中国科研机构对国外金色OA期刊的间接干预机制。【方法】 构建以中国科学家、国外金色OA期刊出版商、中国科研机构为主体的OA出版演化博弈模型，分析其互动策略及稳定性，并通过仿真分析文章处理费、预期拒稿率与科研机构调控策略对博弈结果的影响。【结果】 均衡点和仿真分析结果显示，国外OA期刊出版商可能选择提高与降低期刊质量两种相反的策略，这取决于科学家与科研机构对学术收益、时间成本与经济付出的取舍；科研机构在三方博弈中具有较高的独立性，能有效干预博弈的最终结果。【结论】 我国科研机构可以立足市场优势，借助科研绩效评价体系杠杆调节科学家的投稿意愿，干预国外金色OA期刊出版商的定价与质量管理策略并抑制国外掠夺性期刊，提升我国科研生态系统的整体效益。

关键词: 开放获取期刊, 科学家, 国外金色开放获取期刊出版商, 科研机构, 演化博弈, 中国视角