Abstract:

[Purposes] To clarify the evolutionary game relationships among multiple stakeholders in the governance of predatory journals, reveal the behavioral logic and strategy choices of each stakeholder, and explore the optimal strategies for addressing the issue of predatory journals. [Methods] After analyzing the relationships between different stakeholders, a game theory model was constructed with journal editorial boards, regulatory agencies, and researchers as the main actors. The model aimed to solve for stable strategies, explore the strategic choices of these three parties, and simulate the evolutionary equilibrium strategies under different parameter changes. [Findings] The study found that the governance of predatory journals relies on positive interactions among the stakeholders. In the game, editorial boards occupy a more advantageous position, allowing them to quickly identify and adopt the most beneficial strategies, achieving a stable state of maximum benefit earlier. Due to inadequate regulation, over time, researchers, guided by the principle of maximizing their own interests, tend to choose a “passive” strategy. Because the cost of implementing “efficient” strategies is higher than that of “inefficient” strategies, journal editorial boards lack sufficient internal motivation to promote efficient operations, leading to a tendency toward “inefficient” strategies. As the channels for disseminating journal information become more diversified, the cost for researchers to obtain information decreases, prompting them to gradually evolve toward a “proactive” strategy. [Conclusions] Based on the results of the game analysis, the study proposes specific strategies for addressing predatory journals from the perspectives of journals, regulatory agencies, and researchers.

Key words: Predatory journal governance, Multiple stakeholders, Evolutionary game, Response strategies

摘要：

【目的】 厘清多利益主体在掠夺性期刊治理中的演化博弈关系,揭示各主体的行为逻辑和策略选择,探索掠夺性期刊治理的最优应对策略。【方法】 在梳理不同利益主体间的关系后,构建以期刊编辑部、监管机构和科研人员为主体的博弈关系模型,求解稳定策略,探讨三者的策略选择问题,并仿真演示不同参数变化时模型的演化均衡策略。【结果】 掠夺性期刊的治理依赖于各主体间的良性互动,在博弈中,编辑部占据了更为有利的地位,因此它们能够更快识别出对自己最有利的策略,并且较早地实现利益最大化的稳定状态;由于监管不力等原因,随着时间的推移,科研人员根据利益最大化的原则,会选择“消极”策略;由于实施“高效”策略的成本高于“低效”策略,期刊编辑部缺乏足够的内部动力来推动高效运营,因此其行为决策更可能倾向于“低效”策略;随着期刊信息发布渠道的多元化,科研人员获取信息的成本不断减少,促使其逐渐向“积极”策略演化。【结论】 根据博弈分析结果,分别从期刊、监管机构和科研人员视角提出了治理掠夺性期刊的应对策略。

关键词: 掠夺性期刊治理, 多利益主体, 演化博弈, 应对策略